The German sociologist Max Weber proposed an interpretation
of social action that distinguished between four different idealized types of
rationality. The first, which he called Zweckrational or purposive/instrumental
rationality, is related to the expectations about the behavior of other human
beings or objects in the environment. These expectations serve as means for a
particular actor to attain ends, ends which Weber noted were "rationally pursued
and calculated." The second type, Weber called Wertrational or
value/belief-oriented. Here the action is undertaken for what one might call
reasons intrinsic to the actor: some ethical, aesthetic, religious or other
motive, independent of whether it will lead to success.
The third type was
affectual, determined by an actor's specific affect, feeling, or emotion – to
which Weber himself said that this was a kind of rationality that was on the
borderline of what he considered "meaningfully oriented." The fourth
was traditional, determined by ingrained habituation. Weber emphasized that it
was very unusual to find only one of these orientations: combinations were the
norm. His usage also makes clear that he considered the first two as more
significant than the others, and it is arguable that the third and fourth are
subtypes of the first two.
The advantage in this interpretation is that it avoids a
value-laden assessment, say, that certain kinds of beliefs are irrational.
Instead, Weber suggests that a ground or motive can be given – for religious or
affect reasons, for example — that may meet the criterion of explanation or
justification even if it is not an explanation that fits the Zweckrational
orientation of means and ends. The opposite is therefore also true: some
means-ends explanations will not satisfy those whose grounds for action are
'Wertrational'.
Weber's constructions of rationality have been critiqued both
from a Habermasian (1984) perspective (as devoid of social context and
under-theorised in terms of social power) and also from a feminist perspective
(Eagleton, 2003) whereby Weber's rationality constructs are viewed as imbued
with masculine values and oriented toward the maintenance of male power. An
alternative position on rationality (which includes both bounded rationality
(Simons and Hawkins, 1949), as well as the affective and value-based arguments
of Weber) can be found in the critique of Etzioni (1988), who reframes thought
on decision-making to argue for a reversal of the position put forward by
Weber. Etzioni illustrates how purposive/instrumental reasoning is subordinated
by normative considerations (ideas on how people 'ought' to behave) and
affective considerations (as a support system for the development of human
relationships).
In the psychology of reasoning, psychologists and cognitive
scientists have defended different positions on human rationality. One
prominent view, due to Philip Johnson-Laird and Ruth M.J. Byrne among others is
that humans are rational in principle but they err in practice, that is, humans
have the competence to be rational but their performance is limited by various
factors. However, it has been argued that many standard tests of reasoning,
such as those on the conjunction fallacy, on the Wason selection task, or the
base rate fallacy suffer from methodological and conceptual problems. This has
led to disputes in psychology over whether researchers should (only) use
standard rules of logic, probability theory and statistics, or rational choice
theory as norms of good reasoning. Opponents of this view, such as Gerd
Gigerenzer, favor a conception of bounded rationality, especially for tasks
under high uncertainty.
Richard Brandt proposed a 'reforming definition' of
rationality, arguing someone is rational if their notions survive a form of
cognitive-psychotherapy.
